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OPINION
______________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Terrance Tucker contends in this habeas corpus petition that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel on direct appeal did not raise
the potential claim that Tucker’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was infringed
during his state-court trial. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Tucker’s habeas petition, finding the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, and ordered the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to release Tucker or grant him a new trial. The
Commonwealth appealed. We will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I.
A.
The charges against Tucker stem from the February 20, 2002 homicide of Mikal
Scott. Scott provided statements to police against two members of a rival gang during a
prior murder investigation in 2000, but recanted his statement prior to trial. According to



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and does not constitute binding
precedent. I.O.P. 5.7
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the Commonwealth’s theory of the case and evidence adduced at trial, in retaliation for
Scott recanting his statement, Tucker and a co-conspirator shot and killed Scott.
B.
The Commonwealth charged Tucker with murder and several other offenses. His
trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County began on November 12, 2003.
J.A. 87. After holding an off-the-record discussion with counsel in chambers, the trial
judge closed the courtroom to the public. The judge said, “I have determined that I am
going to close the courtroom for the balance of this proceeding. No citizens will be
permitted to observe this trial until I decide otherwise.” Id. at 182. The judge gave two
reasons for closing the courtroom—courtroom disruptions and witness tampering and
intimidation.
As to the first reason, the judge explained:
During the beginning instructions I noticed many, many citizens coming
into the courtroom whose behavior was not cooperative. They were
attempting to talk to Mr. Tucker. Mr. Tucker was attempting to
communicate with them at points in time when [defense counsel] was
focused on the jury, and to such a degree that I had to have a message sent
to [defense counsel] to have Mr. Tucker stop.
Id. Earlier that day, the judge had twice admonished Tucker’s father and other people in
the gallery for disrupting the trial by speaking to Tucker. Id. at 166, 171. Despite these
admonishments to the gallery, the judge also had to instruct Tucker to “face forward” so
spectators could not communicate with him. Id. at 182. The judge was concerned not
only with the uncooperative behavior of Tucker, his father, and other spectators, but also
3

with the “exceedingly complex” relationships among the witnesses scheduled to testify
on behalf of the Commonwealth and Tucker,1 and how that complexity might affect the
orderly administration of trial. Id. at 183. Closing the courtroom would prevent disruption
and keep witness testimony as “pristine as possible . . . so that the jury has a clean record
with which to work.” Id. As the Superior Court of Pennsylvania later added, “[closure
was] particularly [appropriate] since this case had its genesis in a gang-related dispute.”
Id. at 58.
As to the second reason for closing the courtroom—witness tampering and
intimidation—the trial judge explained that “[the court had] previously documented in
this record that there may have been attempts at witness tampering.” Id. at 182.
Specifically, an eyewitness to the murder, Tonaysha Austin,2 failed to appear on the first
scheduled day of trial because, as the Commonwealth’s attorney explained during the
pretrial colloquy, one of Austin’s relatives who had recently been in jail with Tucker, and
“who she would not identify . . . because she was scared,” had given her a message from
Tucker.3 Id. at 168. Tucker allegedly told Austin’s relative to tell her that “if [Austin]
comes to court that she shouldn’t say he was the one that did it because he wasn’t the one

1

For example, Naima Scott—the sister of Mikal Scott—was also the cousin of Damon
Walls, who was involved in the prior homicide in 2000. See J.A. 297.
2
Austin had been seated in the car behind Scott when he was shot, and had been with
Tucker earlier that day.
3
These incidents of witness tampering impeded the administration of the trial. Because
Austin failed to appear on the first day of trial, the trial had to be postponed to
Wednesday of that week. J.A. 167.
4

who did it.” Id. The Commonwealth acknowledged this threat was “oblique,” id., but
because Austin was “afraid about coming to testify” and “concerned about herself, her
family, and . . . this relative,” the Commonwealth placed her in a hotel “out of
Philadelphia” for “her to feel like she [was] going to be safe,” id. at 169. In her testimony
at Tucker’s trial, Austin expressed she was still “scared” “to be in the room with
[Tucker].” Id. at 197.4
Tucker’s attorney objected to the closure. Id. at 183. The trial judge overruled the
objection, but stated the issue was preserved for review. Id. The jury heard testimony
from fourteen witnesses over the course of three days. Aside from Austin, who testified
on the first and second days of trial, the other testifying witnesses were Anne Williams
(another eyewitness), id. at 259, a medical examiner, id. at 291, two detectives, id. at 236,
239–240, four police officers, id. at 246, 253, 309–10, 316–17, and Tucker’s prior
counsel, id. at 304. Scott’s sister also testified, id. at 296, as did three witnesses for
Tucker during the second half of the third day of witness testimony, id. at 322, 327, 330–
31.

4

The Commonwealth also alleged, and evidence supports, that Austin failed to appear at
the preliminary hearing because she was influenced by a friend of Tucker’s. When asked
at the preliminary hearing if she was threatened not to come, Austin responded “Amir
Muhammed told me that if I didn’t come to Court three times that it would be all thrown
out.” Id. at 308. When pressed on this at Tucker’s trial, Austin testified that prior to the
preliminary hearing, Muhammed, the brother of Isa Muhammed and a friend of Tucker’s,
took Austin to see a lawyer. Id. at 196. “Muhammed went into the room to talk to the
lawyer while [Austin] was sitting outside waiting for him to finish. Then he came back
out and he told me if I don’t come to court three times that it will be dismissed.” Id.
5

Although the record is unclear, it appears the courtroom was not entirely closed
during the entirety of witness testimony. On the first day of witness testimony, during the
first half of Austin’s direct examination, there was a detective in the courtroom who was
on another case as well as an intern for the Commonwealth. Id. at 185. The intern, who
we do not consider a member of the public, was allowed to stay, but the detective was
asked to leave for the remainder of Austin’s direct examination and the first half of her
cross examination. Id. at 198. At the start of the second day, which continued with
Austin’s cross examination, the trial judge noted that her friend, a professor from Drexel
University, and her students were in attendance, taking notes. Id. at 227. It is unclear
from the record how long they stayed. It is also unclear whether any members of the
public were present during the third day of witness testimony.
Once witness testimony had concluded, the trial judge reopened the rest of the
proceedings to the public.5 Id. at 333. On November 19, 2003, the jury found Tucker
guilty of third-degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime, reckless endangerment,
and criminal conspiracy. Id. at 378. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of
thirty to sixty years. Id. at 519.

5

The trial court judge initially only contemplated letting the mothers of the victim and
defendant in, but explained that she “[didn’t] know who Mr. Tucker’s mother [was]
because so many people were trying to get into the courtroom” and “[d]ifferent people
kept claiming that they were [Tucker’s] mom. All kinds of people claimed to be
[Tucker’s] mom.” J.A. 333.
6

C.
Tucker appealed his conviction and sentence to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. Tucker, represented on appeal by his trial counsel, raised six challenges, 6
but did not challenge the courtroom closure. Id. at 806–07. Tucker’s conviction and
sentence were affirmed, id. at 73–84, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
review, Commonwealth v. Tucker, 911 A.2d 935 (Pa. 2006) (table).
Tucker filed a petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. J.A. 768.
Among various ineffectiveness claims, Tucker claimed his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the courtroom closure. Id. at 772. The closure, he
contended, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because it failed to pass
the standard set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 45 (1984). Id. at 772–75. The PCRA court denied Tucker’s petition, explaining the
trial court’s reasoning for not closing the courtroom as follows:
This case grew out of a dispute between two rival gangs. It was preceded
by at least two other murders. The relationship between these groups was
6

On direct appeal, Tucker alleged:
(1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony to establish a motive; (2)
the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of a prosecution witness; (3)
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; (4) the trial court erred in
permitting the court reporter to read back portions of testimony; (5) the evidence
of third-degree murder and conspiracy was insufficient; and (6) the trial court
failed to consider Tucker’s background during sentencing and failed to adequately
explain the length of the sentence.
J.A. 28 (citing Direct Appeal Op. at 4–5).
7

complex and not completely clear. It involved documented violent incidents
of witness intimidation and retaliation. During opening statements a large
group of young men entered the courtroom and attempted quite obviously
to have inappropriate contact with [Tucker], who also attempted to
communicate with the people in the courtroom. As a result, both counsel
were advised of the necessity to close the courtroom in order to preserve the
sanctity of the proceedings.
Id. at 68 (internal citations to the trial record omitted).7
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA order, citing
the above language. Id. at 58. Instead of applying the Waller test, however, it analyzed
the legality of the closure under a state-law standard, and found the closure permissible.
Id. at 57–59. Accordingly, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held Tucker’s appellate
counsel was not ineffective. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again denied review.
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 8 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2010) (table).
D.
Tucker reasserted his ineffective assistance claim in a timely habeas petition. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254; J.A. 569, 646. A Magistrate Judge recommended Tucker’s “petition be
denied as meritless.” J.A. 26. He found the decision to close the courtroom justified under
Waller, because “[a]s the trial court found, many spectators attempted to communicate
with Tucker during opening statements,” and “[t]here had been documented concerns of

Judge Renee Caldwell Hughes presided over Tucker’s initial trial and the PCRA trial.
This is common practice in the Pennsylvania courts. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d
210, 229 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1140 (Pa. 2009)
(noting in passing “that the PCRA judge . . . [is] oftentimes . . . the same judge who
presided over the petitioner’s trial”).
7
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witness intimidation earlier in the case, and the relationships between Tucker, the
decedent, and various witnesses were complex.” Id. at 36.
The District Court disagreed with the Magistrate Judge’s Waller analysis, declined
to adopt his recommendation, and issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the
Commonwealth to either release Tucker or grant him a new trial. Tucker v. Wenerowicz,
98 F. Supp. 3d 760, 781 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The court reasoned the courtroom closure
violated the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Waller, see id.
at 765–66, and held appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal this “plainlymeritorious claim,” id. at 779. The Commonwealth appealed. J.A. 1.
II.8
The Commonwealth contends we must reverse the District Court’s decision
because the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s resolution of Tucker’s ineffective
assistance claim was not contrary to a clearly established holding of the Supreme Court
of the United States. We disagree. The Superior Court applied a standard contrary to
established federal law that was less favorable to Tucker in evaluating the underlying
courtroom closure claim. However, we nonetheless reverse the order of the District Court
granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because we conclude, conducting our
own de novo Strickland review, Tucker has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a
8

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s decision to grant Tucker’s habeas petition. Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92,
100 (3d Cir. 2009).
9

reasonable probability that the outcome in his case would have been different but for his
counsel’s failure to raise the closure issue on appeal.
A.
Because Tucker’s ineffective assistance claim was adjudicated on the merits by
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, it is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, habeas relief is
unavailable unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Tucker does not contend the Superior Court’s decision was factually
erroneous. Instead, he contends, as framed by the District Court, it involved an
“unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)”—the
Supreme Court case addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims—“vis-à-vis
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).” Tucker, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 765.
A decision by a state court is “contrary to . . . clearly established law if it applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in Supreme Court precedent. Price v.
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted). A state court need
not have cited any particular Supreme Court decisions, and this standard affords
considerable latitude to the state court, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of
the state-court decision contradicts” federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)
10

(per curiam) (emphasis added). In this regard, the state court’s decision need not even be
accompanied by an explanation, as long as there was a “reasonable basis for the state
court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
However, “when the state court pens a clear, reasoned opinion, federal habeas
courts may not speculate as to theories that ‘could have supported’ the state court’s
decision.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 834 F.3d 263, 283 (3d Cir. 2016) (en
banc). If a state court does provide reasoning, the state court decision is not entitled to
deference if no “fairminded jurist[]” could “disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 562 U.S.
at 102. The state court may not add or remove a factor from a clearly established federal
law test. Dennis, 834 F.3d at 307 (concluding that adding an admissibility requirement to
Fourteenth Amendment Brady inquiry constituted “an unreasonable application of” and
was “contrary to” clearly established federal law); see also Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d
1040, 1051 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The addition, deletion, or alteration of a factor in a test
established by the Supreme Court . . . constitutes a failure to apply controlling Supreme
Court law under the ‘contrary to’ clause of AEDPA.”).
B.
The federal claim here is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which requires
a defendant to establish (1) constitutionally deficient representation, and (2) resulting
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim serves
as the vehicle for the actual error alleged—the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s analysis
11

of whether there was a violation of Tucker’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
under Supreme Court precedent. The Superior Court engaged in a Sixth Amendment
analysis when determining whether Tucker’s counsel constitutionally erred by not
appealing the courtroom closure, and concluded that because there was no viable Sixth
Amendment claim to appeal, Tucker’s appellate counsel could not have been deficient in
choosing not to appeal it.
Under Supreme Court precedent, closing a courtroom is permissible only if the
following requirements are met: (1) there is “an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced,” (2) the closure is “no broader than necessary to protect that interest,” (3) the
trial court considers “reasonable alternatives” to closure, and (4) the trial court makes
“findings adequate to support the closure.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.9
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania did not apply Waller, but instead applied a
less rigorous standard from Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985). Under
this standard, “[w]here trial courts perceive a threat to the orderly administration of
9

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends for the first time that Waller does not apply
because the closure was “partial” rather than “complete.” See Appellant’s Br. 44–45.
Whether a closure is complete or partial “depends not on how long a trial is closed, but
rather who is excluded during the period of time in question.” United States v. Thompson,
713 F.3d 388, 395 (8th Cir. 2013). While not without doubt, the facts of Thompson are
sufficiently distinguishable that we do not address the standard articulated in that case for
reviewing partial closures. Thompson involved a closure limited only to defendant’s
relatives and only for a single witness’s testimony. Id. In Tucker’s case, the trial judge
chose to close the courtroom during the testimony of all witnesses, including the six law
enforcement officers who testified, and to all members of the public, save for a detective
and a group of students, who were in attendance at the request of a friend of the trial
judge.
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justice in their courtrooms by an unmanageable public, they may always place reasonable
restrictions on access to the courtroom, so long as the basic guarantees of fairness are
preserved . . . .” Berrigan, 501 A.2d at 234. The Superior Court explained it “is the
responsibility of the court to maintain not only the control but also the security of the
courtroom,” J.A. 672 (citing Commonwealth v. Pantano, 836 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003)), and that the right to a public trial “serves two purposes: (1) it prevents the
accused from being subject to a Star Chamber proceeding; and (2) assures the public that
the standards of fairness are being observed.” Id. at 682 (citing Commonwealth v.
Constant, 925 A.2d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)).
The standard applied by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is contrary to Waller.
Specifically, the Superior Court failed to consider the second, third, and fourth prongs of
the Waller test. The Superior Court identified an overriding interest that would be
prejudiced, specifically “disruption caused by the spectators in the courtroom,
particularly since this case had its genesis in a gang-related dispute.” Id. at 683. However,
having identified this interest, the Superior Court concluded its analysis, because “by no
means did the trial resemble a proceeding in the Star Chamber and we have a record of
the proceedings to review on appeal.” Id. at 683.
The standard articulated in Berrigan that allows “reasonable restrictions” on
public access to the courtroom is inconsistent with the narrow tailoring required by
Waller. The Superior Court did not consider whether the closure was narrowly tailored,

13

whether reasonable alternatives to a complete closure existed,10 and did not evaluate
whether the trial court’s findings on the record justified the scope of the closure. See
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. Moreover, the interests identified by the Superior Court and relied
on for its conclusion—preventing “Star Chamber” proceedings and preserving a record
for review—are dramatically narrower than the interests that must be considered under
controlling federal law. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (identifying “strong interest” of the
“public in general” in exposing court proceedings to “the salutary effects of public
scrutiny”). Because both prongs of the Superior Court’s Strickland analysis necessarily
depended on the analysis of the underlying Waller claim, the Superior Court’s Strickland
analysis is an unreasonable application of and contrary to clearly established federal law.
We are deeply concerned that Pennsylvania courts, including the Superior Court in
Tucker’s case, are not applying Waller when analyzing defendants’ Sixth Amendment
public-trial claims. In the first few years after Waller, two Pennsylvania courts of appeal
concluded the closures in those cases violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial because the trial courts had failed to make specific findings in support of the
closure as required under Waller. See Commonwealth v. Penn, 562 A.2d 833, 836–39
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth v. Murray, 502 A.2d 624, 627–29 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). But more recent Pennsylvania decisions, even those with thorough discussions on

10

As discussed infra, the trial court may not have had a clearly established duty to
consider alternatives sua sponte, but the Superior Court failed to even address this clear
Waller requirement.
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closure, have reverted to Pennsylvania’s less rigorous Berrigan standard. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Tirado, No. 3088 EDA 2010, 2013 WL 11259149, at *2 (Pa. Super.
Ct. July 12, 2013) (applying Berrigan in a Sixth Amendment public-trial challenge);
Commonwealth v. Constant, 925 A.2d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (same);
Commonwealth v. Conde, 822 A.2d 45, 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (same). So too here.
Although Tucker cited and argued Waller in both his PCRA petition and in his appellate
brief, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ignored the Waller standard and applied the less
rigorous Pennsylvania standard. J.A. 58 (concluding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it closed the courtroom because the trial court was “acutely—and
justifiably—concerned about the disruption caused by the spectators in the courtroom”).
Because the Superior Court’s Strickland analysis turned on an analysis of the right
to a public trial that is inconsistent with Waller, § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied and the decision
of the Superior Court is not entitled to AEDPA deference.
C.
Having determined that the state court decision is not entitled to deference under
AEDPA, we proceed to a de novo evaluation of the constitutional claim on the merits.
Panetti v Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (“When . . . the requirement set forth in
§ 2254(d)(1) is satisfied[,] [a] federal court must then resolve the claim without the
deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”). As explained previously, Tucker raises a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and thus must establish (1)
constitutionally deficient representation, and (2) resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.
15

at 687. We may consider the Strickland prongs in either order, and we have observed that
“it is often practical to consider the prejudice prong first.” United States v. Fazio, 795
F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2015). To demonstrate prejudice, petitioner must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
In this case, to establish prejudice, Tucker must establish that but for his counsel’s
failure to raise the courtroom closure claim on direct appeal, the outcome of his appeal
would have been different. Thus, Tucker must demonstrate that the underlying Waller
claim would have had a reasonable probability of success—“sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The “mere possibility” that the
outcome would have been different is not sufficient to establish Strickland prejudice.
Rountree v. Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 2011). Tucker has not met this burden.
Under the first prong of Waller, the interests cited by the trial judge—maintaining
order and preventing witness intimidation and tampering—were overriding. See
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 514 (1974) (“[C]ases in this Court have
consistently . . . . [recognized] the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere
in the courtroom.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 562 (1965) (“[I]t is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice
be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and
untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional
democracy.”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), (d) (federal witness-tampering statute);
16

18 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4952 (West 2002) (state witness-tampering statute).
These interests were likely to be prejudiced in the absence of closure because audience
members had already disrupted the trial on multiple occasions. More significantly,
Tucker’s trial was part of a dispute between two rival gangs that had previously resorted
to witness intimidation, and Austin feared testifying after Tucker purportedly threatened
her. See Tucker, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
On the second prong, the scope of the closure was not overbroad based on
adequate findings of fact—as required under the fourth prong of Waller. With respect to
witness tampering and intimidation, on each day the courtroom was closed, witnesses
testified who either had already been tampered with or intimidated, or for whom there
was a strong likelihood of tampering or intimidation. Austin testified on days one and
two, Anne Williams (another eyewitness who lived in the neighborhood) on day two, and
Naima Scott (the sister of the victim) as well as Tucker’s witnesses testified on day three.
These witnesses had connections to rival gangs and to one another. The trial judge
observed on the record that it was impossible to tell who was who in the gallery,
particularly because some observers when asked provided obviously false identities. J.A.
333 (“[A]ll these different women kept coming up saying I am his mother . . . .”). In view
of these findings by the trial court, even if it is possible that an appellate court could hold
that a more specific parsing of the closure throughout the day would have been feasible,
we cannot say that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal
would be different. On the contrary, a reviewing court would likely conclude—given the
17

gang related origins of the case, the number of people involved in the underlying
incidents and resulting witness intimidation, the frequent and unexpected disruptions, and
the repeated disregard of the trial court's many admonishments to Tucker and the
gallery—that the trial court's decision to close the courtroom for the entirety of the
witness testimony was not overly broad and was necessary to stymie further witness
intimidation and to maintain control of the courtroom.
With respect to the third prong, at the time of Tucker’s trial, there was some
uncertainty whether this step of the Waller test compelled courts to consider reasonable
alternatives sua sponte, or whether the party opposing closure had to propose them.11 In
2010, several years after Tucker’s trial, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved
this possible uncertainty, holding that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to
closure even when they are not offered by the parties . . . .” Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S.
209, 214 (2010).
The trial court no doubt could have been more explicit in considering alternatives
to closure on the record. But implicit in the trial court's findings and the observations she
made on the record was her consideration and rejection of a number of alternatives,
including addressing disruptions as they arose, J.A. 182 (trial judge explaining that her

11

See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (declining to
consider “[w]hether or not a sua sponte obligation exists [under Waller] to consider
alternatives to complete closure”); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 169 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (concluding sua sponte consideration was unnecessary in the context of partial
closure involving a child abuse victim).
18

repeated admonishments to the gallery and Tucker had been unsuccessful as they
continued “attempting to communicate” with each other to the point that she needed to
send defense counsel “a message . . . to have Mr. Tucker stop”), barring particular
persons who were disruptive from the courtroom, id. at 182-83 (trial court stating that
during the opening instructions “many, many citizens [came] into the courtroom whose
behavior was not cooperative” and indicating exclusion of only those persons was not
feasible due to the “exceedingly complex” relationships among the parties who are
related both “by blood, [and] by marriage” and who “live in the same neighborhood
together”), and allowing certain non-disruptive persons back into the courtroom, id. at
333 (trial court noting it was amenable to allowing Tucker's and victim's mothers back
into courtroom but was unable to distinguish among the many women who represented
themselves as Tucker's mother). In addition, the trial court's decision to close the
courtroom was preceded by an off-the-record discussion with counsel. Id. at 182. It is
apparent under these circumstances that the trial judge did consider alternatives, and,
particularly given the incidents of witness tampering and complicated relationships
between the people in the courtroom and the fact that Tucker was charged with the
murder of a witness to a prior homicide in an ongoing gang dispute, id. at 241-42, she
reasonably concluded that none would have alleviated the concerns of witness tampering
and courtroom control. See Presley, 558 U.S. at 209 (“Trial courts are obligated to take
every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.”).

19

The fourth prong of Waller is satisfied as well. Under the fourth prong, “the
particular interest, and threat to that interest, must ‘be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered.’” Presley, 558 U.S. at 215 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct.
of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). As outlined above, the trial judge
articulated the overriding interests on the record and explained why she decided that a
closed trial was the best way to protect those interests. J.A. 182–83. While the trial judge
could have been more explicit as to why she rejected alternatives short of a complete
closure, the findings are sufficient to determine whether the closure order was properly
entered.
We conclude that Tucker has failed to meet his burden of showing that but for the
failure of his appellate counsel to raise the Waller claim there is a reasonable probability
the outcome of his appeal would have been different. For this reason, we will reverse the
District Court’s order granting Tucker’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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